University of Pennsylvania Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2013

A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at
Third Party Litigation Funding
David S. Abrams
University of Pennsylvania, dabrams@law.upenn.edu

Daniel L. Chen
ETH Zurich, chendan@ethz.ch

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Courts Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Other Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Abrams, David S. and Chen, Daniel L., "A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding" (2013). Faculty
Scholarship. Paper 875.
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/875

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

A MARKET FOR JUSTICE: A FIRST EMPIRICAL
LOOK AT THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING
David S. Abrams and Daniel L. Chen*
ABSTRACT
The alienability of legal claims holds the promise of increasing access
to justice and fostering development of the law. While much theoretical
work points to this possibility, no empirical work has investigated the
claims, largely due to the rarity of trading in legal claims in modern
systems of law. In this paper we take the first step toward empirically
testing some of these theoretical claims using data from Australia. We find
some evidence that third-party funding corresponds to an increase in
litigation and court caseloads. Cases with third-party funders are more
prominent than comparable ones. While third-party funding may have
effects on both the cases funded and the courts in jurisdictions where it is
most heavily used, the overall welfare effects are ambiguous.
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INTRODUCTION
The primary argument for markets is that they increase overall welfare
by allocating goods and services where they are most valued.1 Market
forces can provide a powerful disciplinary effect on human behavior and
the production of goods and services. Yet we don’t see markets form
everywhere. This paper deals with one missing marking in particular: the
market for litigation.
Suppose we allow individuals the right to trade litigation claims, 2
thereby creating a market for justice. This could be a market-based
solution to the undersupply of some types of litigation. Would such a
market spur innovation, increase settlement rates, and avoid taint?3
Selling litigation rights to parties with the resources to pursue the
claims may address the problem of litigation undersupply due to credit
constraints, risk aversion, collective action problems, or simply
unawareness, even when a plaintiff or defendant has a positive expected
payoff. A market for litigation should lead initially to more litigation,
thereby clarifying disputes earlier. This could have large positive
externalities, as future actors would have greater certainty about the law
and therefore could make better-informed decisions. While government
subsidies in the form of legal aid partially address these issues,4 a market
for justice has the potential to have a much greater impact.
This paper makes the first attempt to quantify empirically the effects

1. See, e.g., VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK AND US 7 (2008) (discussing this argument).
2. We use the terms “litigation trading,” “a market for litigation,” and “third-party
funding” interchangeably. Each term refers to the ability of individuals or firms with no
direct interest in a particular claim to buy a fraction of that claim.
3. At a roundtable discussion session held at the conclusion of the 2010 UCLARAND Center for Law & Public Policy on Third-Party Litigation Funding and Claim
Funding, it was noted that the stigma associated with this legal practice is managed in nonU.S. jurisdictions through “institutional acceptance, leadership by members of the judiciary,
and law firms that champion[ ] third-party funding in the absence of contingency-fee
arrangements.” RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE PROGRAM, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2010) [hereinafter RAND INSTITUTE CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS], available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/2010/RAND_CF272.pdf.
4. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice for America’s Poor in the Year 2020: Some
Possibilities Based on Experiences Here and Abroad, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2009)
(discussing public funding of legal services in the United States).
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of a third-party litigation funding system. Using data from the leading
Australian litigation-funding firm and Australian courts, we examine the
impact of litigation funding on courts and on cases that receive funding.
The empirical strategy compares the outcomes in Australian states where
litigation-funding firms are active to the outcomes in areas where they are
not active.
Undersupply of litigation funding may result from several sources.
Credit-constrained individuals or firms may have positive expected-value
litigation claims, but be unable to pursue them due to lack of funds.5
Allowing third-party funders to buy a claim or a fraction thereof could
allow a case to proceed where it would not have previously.6 The claims
pursued with such financing would tend to be more costly and be brought
by less-wealthy individuals or firms.7
Risk-averse individuals or firms will also eschew pursuit of positive
expected-value claims, but not necessarily due to cost considerations. The
uncertainty inherent in legal proceedings will reduce the value relative to a
risk-neutral entity.8 Thus, the transfer of a claim from a risk-averse to a
risk-neutral party should yield an increase in total claims pursued. The
transferred claims would be riskier and be brought by more risk-averse
entities. 9
There are other contexts in which third-party funding or litigation
5. See generally J. P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279,
281 (1973) (developing a framework for “analyzing the problem of trading among
individuals in the face of uncertainty”); James W. Huges & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation
and Settlement Under the English and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 225 (1995) (examining behavior under two different legal fee regimes); William M.
Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971) (describing the
economic theory for pre-trial settlement agreements); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973)
(explaining the procedural rules and practices that inform the legal-dispute resolution
regime); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1983) (developing a model of the litigation process that identifies the
characteristics of suits that settle and suits that are litigated).
6. See RAND INSTITUTE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that
“[b]ecause the [litigation] process is so expensive, many with valid claims forgo litigation
completely” and arguing that “[t]hird-party approaches to financing litigation . . . may
encourage more parties to pursue their claims” and thereby “reduce the problem of unfiled
claims.”) .
7. See id. (arguing that litigation funding “could provide access to the courts for those
who could otherwise not afford protracted litigation,” while cautioning that “[f]inancing
may not flow to those litigants who cannot afford to litigate.”).
8. See RAND INSTITUTE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, app. B at 122
(“Parties choosing between a certain outcome and an uncertain outcome [in litigation] will
be guided by their risk preferences”).
9. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 84 (2010) [hereinafter Molot, Litigation Finance] (discussing
risk-aversion affects bargaining positions of litigants).
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trading could affect the claims pursued. For example, multiple parties that
share a claim in complex cases may face a collective action problem: while
individually the case is not worth pursuing, it would be worth pursuing if
all the benefits accrued to one party.10 Allowing the trading of claims
makes it possible for this transfer of benefits to proceed.
One further group that could benefit from litigation trading consists of
individuals and firms unaware that they possess a legal claim. If
information about the legal system is imperfect,11 there will be entities that
fall into this category. The ability of third parties to benefit in some way
from the prospective resolution of claims creates an incentive to locate and
provide information to otherwise unaware claim holders.
Litigation trading is not the only way to address the failure to pursue
positive expected-value claims. In some legal systems, including the
United States’, contingency fees partially serve this purpose by lowering or
eliminating entry costs for clients in addition to dispersing some of the risk
of litigation.12 There are some important differences between contingency
10. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 36 (citing Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive
Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 481 (1995)) (discussing
Choharis’ argument that extending the market for tort claims to allow investor involvement
would increase access to justice, partially because it would overcome the collective action
problem). Similar reasoning applies to the funding of class actions lawsuits. As some
scholars have noted, however, the benefits of addressing the collective action problem must
be weighed against the increased agency costs associated with adding layers between claims
and the original claim holders. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 534–48 (1991) (discussing
conflicts of interest between attorneys and class action participants with regard to fee
arrangements and settlement preferences); John C. Coffee, The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 887–88 (1987) (examining potentially detrimental effects of
entrepreneurial litigation on those represented by class counsel); David Friedman, More
Justice for Less Money, 39 J. LAW & ECON. 211 (1996) (suggesting alternative method for
allocating damages in asbestos class action case); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12–27 (1991) (proposing
auction in which attorneys bid opportunity to represent class, thereby restoring equilibrium
between client and attorney interests).
11. Certainly the system of law schools, bar certification, and ongoing professional
education requirements seems to indicate that knowledge of the law is a specialized skill.
Thus, the notion that an individual without this specialized knowledge is unaware that he
possesses a legal claim is entirely plausible. See Louis Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal
Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102
HARV. L. REV. 565, 576 (1989) (noting that “individuals[ ] [have] generally imperfect
knowledge of the law and the legal system,” in the context of deciding whether to present
evidence to a tribunal in the absence of legal advice); see also WAYE, supra note 1, at 257
(discussing the motivation for third-party funders and attorneys operating under contingentfee arrangements to “identify[ ] potential claim holders and market[ ] their services to
them”).
12. 23 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
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fees and litigation trading, however. The most prominent difference is that
the potential funder in the contingency fee system must be an attorney.13
This can lead to some less desirable outcomes relative to litigation trading.
For example, limiting potential funders to attorneys necessarily restricts the
liquidity of the market for litigation, meaning that some positive
expectation claims still may not be pursued because of an inability to find
financing. It also may skew the claims that do get funded in favor of those
that fit the risk profile of litigators. Many contingency-fee attorneys are
unlikely to work on cases that have a low chance of success, even if the
expected value is high.14 The contingency fee system also ends up
imposing a large cost on clients, usually in the range of thirty percent—an
amount that could be substantially decreased in a more competitive market
for funding.15
At the introduction of a rule allowing litigation trading, one would
expect an increase in initial legal claims from the credit-constrained, the
risk-averse, and the previously ill-informed.16 Whether this would translate
into an overall increase in litigation, however, is unclear. One would
expect the introduction of a third-party funder to alleviate the problem of
skewed settlements resulting from a risk-averse, one-off plaintiff engaging
with a large defendant able to absorb and spread the cost.17 This would
CONTRACTS § 62:4, 292-93 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2011) (stating that one purpose of
contingent fee contracts is to allow plaintiffs access to legal services); Vince Morabito,
Federal Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing Litigation Costs 21
MONASH U. L. REV. 231, 244 (1995) (stating that one of the benefits of contingency fees is
that “they ‘increase[e] access to justice by removing or reducing some of the costs [sic]
disincentives that currently deter the initiation of legal proceedings’”); see also Molot,
Litigation Finance, supra note 9, at 90 (“[C]ontingent fee arrangements transfer litigation
risk from one-time plaintiffs, who are ill equipped to bear that risk, to attorneys who . . . can
more easily bear the risk”). Insurance markets are another alternative method for addressing
the misalignment of incentives for pursuing positive-value claims. See, e.g., Tom Baker &
Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ &
Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 489 (2007) (discussing the
transfer of corporate liability to insurance companies and noting that ownership of liability
incentivizes insurance companies to “reintroduce[e] the deterrence function of corporate and
securities law”).
13. See Molot, Litigation Finance, supra note 9, at 91 (noting that “only lawyers are
permitted to take a share of the plaintiff’s claim under a contingent fee arrangement”). For a
discussion of contingency fees and attorney behavior, see Lester Brickman, The Market for
Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65
(2003).
14. Seth Lesser, Partner, Klafter Olsen & Lesser LLP, Comments at RAND Litigation
Finance Conference in Washington, D.C. (May 20, 2010) [hereinafter Seth Lesser
Comments] (notes on file with authors).
15. WAYE, supra note 1, at 134.
16. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text (explaining this assumption).
17. See Molot, Litigation Finance, supra note 9, at 83-85 (discussing risk aversion,
repeat litigants, and skewed settlements).

1080

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 15:4

lead to an increase in settlement rates as defendants adapted to the
involvement of third-party funders.18
The overall welfare effects of introducing third-party funding into a
legal system are also ambiguous. While benefits to several groups have
been mentioned, they are not comprehensive. For example, an additional
benefit of litigation trading may be clarification of the law. Should
litigation trading increase, one would expect to not only see an increase in
resources expended on litigation in general, but also a diversification of
plaintiffs and claims.19 Consequently, previously unaddressed legal
questions would arise and be resolved more quickly. This would lead to
more efficient behaviors as parties make better-informed decisions.
There are also potential costs of allowing litigation trading. Legal
prohibitions against maintenance, the practice of a party “without interest”
in a suit assisting in litigation, and champerty, receiving a share of the
proceeds of a suit, were intended to prevent the perversion of justice.20 The
concerns voiced by courts over these early forms of third-party funding
could plague modern litigation claim-trading systems as well. Another
concern is that a rule change could lead to a vast increase in litigation with
low social value, which would in turn congest the courts and divert their
resources from more socially valuable litigation.
In this paper, we aim to add to the discussion of whether and to what
extent third-party litigation funding should be available by providing the
first empirical evidence relevant to these considerations. Effects on
aggregate welfare are always difficult to measure convincingly, and we
cannot do so directly here. This would require a great deal of detailed
information on all manner of claims brought, most of which end in
settlement.21 Settlement data is notoriously difficult to collect, as its

18. Id.
19. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text (noting that litigation funding allows
more risk adverse parties to bring claims and for more complex claims to be brought).
20. Our definitions of maintenance and champerty are derived from Shukaitis. Marc J.
Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 330 n.1 (1987);
see also Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 219-20 (2003)
(quoting Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132, 143 (1823) in characterizing maintenance as “an
offense against public justice,” which “perverts the remedial process of the law into an
engine of oppression” and noting that “[t]he ancient practices of champerty and maintenance
have been vilified”). For more information about the history of maintenance and champerty
in Australia, see infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
21. While settlement rates vary by location and nature of claim, settlement in civil
trials has been estimated to be as high as ninety-five percent. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia
Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994) (citing frequently quoted figures that settlement rates are
between eighty-five and ninety-five percent, but cautioning that these figures may be
misleading); see also Cooper Alexander, supra note 10, at 498 (noting that “only a tiny
fraction of litigated cases—perhaps five percent or less—are actually tried to judgment”).
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reporting is not required except in very limited circumstances.22 However,
by empirically examining the first major implementation of a third-party
funding system, we are able to shed some light on the central questions.
Specifically, we collect data from Australian courts, administrative
agencies, and the largest third-party litigation funding firm in Australia,
IMF (Australia) Ltd.23 Using this data, we take two approaches to
understanding the impact of third-party funding on various outcomes.
First, we use IMF’s entry into an Australian state as a proxy for the
relaxing of rules against third-party funders. Using court data, we can
examine the effects of the rule change on the processing and expense of
litigation in the courts. We attempt to control for overall time trends and
state-specific differences by using criminal data as a control, since thirdparty funding is only available in civil litigation. We find that third-party
funding does appear to be associated with increased expense to the courts,
an increased backlog, and an increase in average case duration.24
Second, we use a case study methodology to examine a handful of
published cases considered by IMF, some of which were funded and some
of which were not. By examining all cases considered by IMF and not just
funded cases, we attempt to eliminate some of the selection bias inherent in
the process of choosing cases for funding.25 Here, we find a difference in
the impact of cases that were funded from those that were not. The funded
cases cite substantially more cases than unfunded ones, and are themselves
cited over twice as frequently. This evidence supports the notion that thirdparty funding can spur the development of law.
The past several years have seen a major downturn in the market for
legal services.26 New technologies are allowing the outsourcing of more
legal matters, and firms are becoming increasingly global.27 As such, many
countries around the world are reconsidering restrictions on various legal
22. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 528 (1997)
(explaining that “researchers cannot easily obtain settlement data because parties often keep
settlements confidential, making it very difficult to test . . . the most serious effects of
frivolous litigation”).
23. The Australian firm IMF (www.imf.co.au) is not to be confused with the
International Monetary Fund.
24. See infra pt. 0.
25. Of course, we cannot eliminate the selection effect completely, because even
within the group of considered cases, there may be some unobservable characteristics that
affected the ones that were picked for funding. But using the considered cases as the
universe should at least mitigate the effect.
26. See Eli Wald, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2051 (2010) (discussing the recent downturn in the legal services
market).
27. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2138-42
(2010) (describing the trend towards outsourcing legal services).
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practices that would allow for, among other things, law firms to be publicly
traded, firms to take on non-attorney partners, and litigation to be funded
by third parties.28 In this paper, we hope to add some empirical evidence to
help inform policy discussions in the last category.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we provide
some of the history behind prohibitions on third party funding and its
evolution, and then discuss in detail how litigation funding works in
Australia. We then introduce a new model of the potential impact of
litigation funding. Next, we present empirical specifications and data
sources, followed by our main empirical results. This is followed by an
exploration of the limitations of these findings, and then concluding
remarks.
I. BACKGROUND
Prohibitions on third-party involvement in litigation have a medieval
origin.29 During this era in England, coercive litigation was used by
wealthy landowners as a means to obtain more land.30 This often took the
form of funding litigation by third parties with the express goal of
acquiring more land at below-market prices.31 This eventually led to a
response by the legislature, which passed a number of statutes that included
prohibitions on maintenance and champerty.32
These prohibitions remained in effect in several common law
jurisdictions through today.33 As legal systems have become more
formalized and less prone to outside corruption, the rationale for these
doctrines has waned. Many jurisdictions have abolished maintenance and

28. See Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal & Economic Approach to ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 345-46 (2011) (comparing
various legal systems and third-party funding).
29. WAYE, supra note 1, at 12 (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 19 (John Bowring ed., 1843); Max Radin, Maintenance by Champtery, 24 CAL. L.
REV. 48, 57–62 (1935); and Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and Champerty,
35 L. Q. REV. 50, 51 (1919)).
30. WAYE, supra note 1, at 12-13; see also Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The
Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 797 (2004)
(“[t]he common law maintenance doctrine developed in feudal England in response to the
practice of feudal lords of maintaining all of their retainers’ lawsuits in order to enlarge their
estates.”).
31. WAYE, supra note 1, at 12.
32. WAYE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
33. The United States still permits litigants to advance the theories of maintenance and
champerty to challenge the validity of contracts, though those theories are rarely used in
practice. See Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress; Third-Party Funding of American
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 584-87 (2010) (providing a brief history of American
courts’ attitudes towards third-party funding).
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champerty as torts,34 and England abandoned them in 1967 with the
Criminal Law Act.35 In Australia a number of states have abolished
prohibitions on maintenance and champerty, including New South Wales,
Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, and South Australia.36 In the United
States, although there have been few prosecutions for maintenance or
champerty in the last century,37 the legal theories underlying the doctrines
are still considered valid.38 In recent years, Australia has abandoned
prohibitions on champerty and maintenance.39
Third-party litigation funding provides financial support for litigation
by an entity that is not a party to the litigation and with no direct interest in
the outcome. It is therefore a direct violation of the doctrine of
maintenance. Historically, third-party litigation funding has been tolerated
in some contexts, such as the disposition by liquidators40 or trustees41 in

34. WAYE, supra note 1, at 14.
35. WAYE, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, §§ 13, 14 (U.K.)).
36. Waye, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1955
(ACT) s 68 (Austl.) as amended by Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 221 (Austl.);
Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act (No 88) 1993 (NSW) (Austl.);
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) sch 11 ss 1(3), 3(1) (Austl.); Crimes Act 1958
(Vic) s 322A (Austl.); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 32 (Austl.)). Even though criminal
sanctions were abolished for maintenance and champerty, the common law ability to reject
such contracts for public policy reasons remains. Overall, however, and in all districts, such
contracts are usually enforceable. WAYE, supra note 1, at 15.
37. See Waye, supra note 1, at 14-15 (“Only a handful of cases have applied
maintenance and champerty as torts in the United States in the last one hundred years.”);
Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 30, at 801-04 (comparing approaches to maintenance and
champerty in United States jurisdictions); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation Online: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 87-89 (2002) (examining
state approaches to champerty); Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry:
The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
55, 57-58 (2004) (“[I]n the United States, even in states that have maintained the prohibition
against champerty in general, there have always been exceptions to the prohibition.”).
38. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 14-15 (“[C]hamperty and maintenance continue to
survive as rules of public policy . . .”); Lyon, supra note 33, at 584 (“Champtery and
maintenance still rear their heads in American courts. Though raised infrequently, they
retain currency, at least in some jurisdictions.”); Paul Bond, Comment, Making Champerty
Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2002) (“[C]hamperty’s
critics underestimate the continuing vitality of the doctrine.”).
39. England, like Australia, has also abolished maintenance and champerty as torts and
offenses. WAYE, supra note 1, at 14; see also George R. Barker, Third-Party Litigation
Funding in Australia and Europe, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 451, 493-94 (2012) (discussing the
abolition of maintenance and champerty as offenses in the U.K. and Australia).
40. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 57 (citing cases involving disposition by liquidators)
(citing In re Park Gate Waggon Works Co. (1881) 17 Ch. 234 (Eng.) (disposition by
liquidator); Re Movitor Pty Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 380 (Austl.) (disposition by liquidator);
UTSA Pty Ltd v Ultra Tune Australia (1998) 146 FLR 209 (Austl.) (disposition by
liquidator); Re Tosich Constr. Pty Ltd (1997) 73 FCR 219 (Austl.) (disposition by
liquidator); Re William Felton & Co Pty Ltd (1998) 145 FLR 211 (Austl.) (disposition by
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bankruptcy of an insolvent’s causes of action.42 In Australia, the scope of
litigation funding has recently expanded with the emergence of funders
who support general commercial litigation with no interest other than
potential return on an investment.43 Third parties usually agree to fund
litigation in exchange for a fraction of any amount recovered in the
litigation, plus any reimbursed costs ordered. Litigation funding is used in
bankruptcy proceedings, breach of contract suits, and class action
lawsuits.44
The change in Australia has been due partly to the gradual abolition of
maintenance and champerty, which made it legal for funders to begin
operations. Most Australian third-party funders in the 1980’s and 1990’s
operated in the area of bankruptcy, historically an area in which the law
was relatively clear about the legality of the third party funding.45 Funders
began operating to a limited extent in other areas in the late 1990s and
2000s, but did not expand rapidly because there was still substantial
uncertainty about the legality of their ventures. It was not until the
landmark Fostif decision in 2006 that the law regarding third-party funding
was truly clarified.46
Fostif arose from a previous decision, Roxborough v. Rothmans of
Pall Mall Ltd.,47 concerning payments to tobacco retailers by tobacco
wholesalers. The Fostif proceedings were initiated, organized, and funded
by an outside company, Firmstone Pty Ltd.; on appeal, Australia’s highest
court took up the issue of the legality of the payment arrangement between
the parties.48 Firmstone had signed agreements with over two thousand
plaintiffs in connection with the damage recovery. The agreements

liquidator)).(noting that this statutory exception only applies to property of the company.
See Re Fresjac Pty Ltd (1995) 65 SASR 334 (Austl.)).
41. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 57 (citing cases involving disposition by a trustee)
(citing Seear v Lawson (1880) 15 Ch D 729 (Eng.) (disposition by trustee); Guy v. Churchill
(1888) 40 Ch D 481 (Eng.) (disposition by trustee); Re Nguyen, Ex parte Official Trustee in
Bankruptcy (1992) 35 FCR 320 (disposition by trustee); Re Cirillo, Ex parte Offficial
Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 65 FCR 576 (disposition by trustee)).
42. See Interview with John Walker, Managing Director, IMF, (Australia) LTD (July
16, 2008) (interview notes on file with authors) (giving a brief overview of the history of
maintence and champerty in Australia and third-party litigation funding) . See also Hugh
McLernon, In Support of Professional Litigation Funding 37-39 (IMF (Austl.) Ltd Litig.
Funding Working Paper, 2005) (discussing the history of third-party litigation funding).
43. WAYE, supra note 1, at 58-63.
44. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 55; see also Laurie Glanfield, Litigation funding in
Australia, Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Discussion Paper (2006) (describing
the legal context of litigation funding).
45. Interview with John Walker, supra note 42.
46. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v. Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 (Austl.).
47. Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd., (2001) 208 CLR 516 (Austl.).
48. Fostif, (2006) 229 CLR 386.
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included provisions that Firmstone would receive any litigation costs
awarded to the plaintiffs plus one-third of the payments recovered from the
wholesalers.49 Firmstone would also pay all litigation and other associated
costs and would arrange for counsel if litigation was necessary.50
The high court addressed the legality of Firmstone’s arrangement with
plaintiffs from two angles, asking (1) whether the actions of Firmstone
constituted an abuse of process and (2) whether allowing it was counter to
public policy. The court determined that the mere action of litigation
funding by a third party was not an abuse of process.51 It further found
that, in jurisdictions where maintenance and champerty had been abolished,
third-party litigation could not be counter to public policy.52 By so holding,
the Court solidified the footing of third-party funding in Australia.53
The Fostif decision occurred in the context of growing demand for
litigation funding in Australia. In recent decades, the Australian population
has increasingly looked to the legal system to determine social policy, as
well as individual rights and duties.54 In concert with the court’s increased
presence in daily interactions, Australians have also demanded greater
access to the judicial system.55 This general demand for access has been
met by allowing third-party funders to both participate in, and, to a certain
extent create, the market for legal claims.
Earlier court decisions had articulated a narrow range of situations in
which claims assignment could be employed. For example, as early as
1908, courts permitted the transfer of claims in situations in which the
funder had a legitimate interest in the result of the lawsuit.56 This
legitimate interest requirement could be met where the parties were related

49. Id. at 477.
50. WAYE, supra note 1, at 236.
51. Fostif, (2006) 229 CLR at 436.
52. Id. at 432-435.
53. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 55 (noting that the Australian High Court effectively
authorized litigation funding in its Fostif ruling, but cautioning that “Australian
jurisprudence certainly stops well short of allowing full claim alienability and directly
rejects the commodification of legal claims”); Michael Legg et al., Litigation Funding in
Australia 2 (Univ. of N.S.W. Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 12,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1579487 (“Since the
High Court gave its ruling in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Limited v Fostif Pty Ltd, the
Australian litigation funding industry has enjoyed significant growth.”).
54. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 58 (citing Sir Anthony Mason, Law and Morality, 4
GRIFFITH L. REV. 147, 148–51 (1995) (commenting that the decline of religion, the extended
family unit, and the disintegration of old social and economic conventions and standards
have accentuated the importance of law in society and generated the expectation that the law
will provide resolutions to pressing political and social problems)).
55. WAYE, supra note 1, at 58.
56. WAYE, supra note 1, at 58 (citing British Cash & Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson
Store Svc. Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006 (Eng.)).
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by blood and in employer-employee relationships.57
Likewise, an
association established to protect the legal interests of its membership was
also considered to have a legitimate interest.58 The funders were also
required to demonstrate that they neither planned to “on-sell” the claim nor
“wager” on the outcome of the litigation.59
Funders that possess a “legitimate commercial interest[ ] in the
outcome of a dispute also fall outside the prohibition against assignment of
a bare cause of action.”60 Such an interest “might arise out of a charge over
the assets and undertaking of the funded party’s property,” or 61 could exist
where the funder claimed a right to “commission under disputed
contracts.”62 Courts characterized some interests as mere hopes, and
declined to permit a funder’s intervention in situations in which the
funder’s commercial interest was contingent upon a favorable outcome in
the litigation.63 A “hope” of a commercial interest does not amount to a
recognizable commercial interest.
In situations involving a bankrupt claim holder, the courts have
permitted a broader definition of legitimate interest.64 In bankruptcy, the
bankrupt entity assigns its legal claims to the trustee, thereby allowing the
trustee to pursue the matters in court.65 The bankruptcy exception to the
prohibition against transfer of claims is justified for two reasons. First,
liquidators, receivers, and trustees in bankruptcy owe fiduciary duties to the
entity’s creditors and debtors alike; thus, the interests of the parties are
aligned despite the lack of a traditionally conceived “legitimate interest” in

57. Id. (employing the legitimate interest requirement)).
58. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 58 (citing Martell v Consett Iron Co Ltd [1955] Ch 363
(Eng.) (unincorporated association); Magic Menu Sys. Pty Ltd v AFA Facilitation Pty Ltd
(1996) 72 FCR 261 (Austl.) (franchise); Moloney v Housing Indus. Ass’n Ltd (Unreported,
Tas SC Dec. 4, 1992) (Austl.) (trade association)).
59. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 58 (citing S. Australian Asset Mgmt. Corp. v Sheahan
(1995) 13 ACLC 328 (Austl.); JC Scott Constrs. Pty Ltd v Mermaid Waters Tavern Pty Ltd
[1982] 2 Qd.R. 413 (Austl.); Re Movitor Pty Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 380 (Austl.); Trendtex
Trading Corp. v. Credit Suisse [1982] A.C. 679 (Eng.); Giles v. Thompson [1994] 1 A.C.
142, 146 (U.K.)).
60. Waye, supra note 1, at 58.
61. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 58 (citing Vangale Pty Ltd v Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd
[2002] QSC 137 (Austl.)).
62. Id.
63. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 58-59 (citing Project 28 Pty Ltd (formerly Narui Gold
Coast Pty Ltd) v Barr, [2005] NSWCA 240 (Austl.)).
64. See WAYE, supra note 1, at 59 (citing Stevens v Keogh (1946) 72 CLR 1, 2 (Austl.)
(holding that funding by the Police Association of New South Wales of an action brought by
an insolvent member was not maintenance)).
65. In re Tomaiolo, 205 B.R. 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (legal malpractice claims
were property of estate and trustee therefore had right to pursue those claims);. But see
Christison v. Jones, 405 N.E.2d 8 (Bankr. Ill. App. 3d 1980) (holding that a legal
malpractice claim is not part of the bankrupt’s estate because it is not subject to assignment).
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the disposition of claims.66 They act as officers of the court and are
obligated to perform their role, within the boundaries of the respective
statutory provisions, to satisfy the interests of the creditors. Second, the
trustee who fails to fulfill his or her duties to “close [the bankrupt entity’s]
estate . . . as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties
in interest”67 may risk loss of fees and/or prosecution, both civil and
criminal.68
In general, Australian courts now appear to welcome litigation
funding. According to QPSX Ltd v Ericcson Australia Pty Ltd., the
exercise of due diligence and formulation of budgets by firms like IMF
injects “a welcome element of commercial objectivity into the way in
which such [complex commercial litigation] budgets are framed and the
efficiency with which the litigation is conducted.”69
II. WHAT LITIGATION FUNDERS DO
Litigation funding firms provide references, expertise, and most
importantly, capital, to third parties pursuing legal claims.70 In exchange,
the funders receive a portion of the proceeds of any settlement or award at
trial. While these firms could purchase the entire payoff from a claim, this
would create a principal-agent problem. In most cases, the cooperation of
the original claim holder is essential to successfully prosecuting a claim,71
and the best way to ensure this cooperation is by leaving the original claim
holder holding a substantial portion of the claim to ensure the original
claim holder’s future cooperation. Thus, in practice, litigation funding

66. See In re WHET, Inc., 750 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1984) (a trustee in bankruptcy “owes
a fiduciary duty to debtor and creditors alike to act fairly and protect their interests”); In re
Rigden, 795 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The trustee . . . has a fiduciary obligation to
conserve the assets of the estate and to maximize distribution to creditors.”); In re Heinsohn,
247 B.R. 237, 244 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (“A bankruptcy trustee is a fiduciary of the estate, its
beneficiaries and the creditors.”).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006).
68. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 5 F.3d 750 (Bankr. 4th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
source of trustee liabilities as Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951)); In re NWFX, Inc.,
384 B.R. 214 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2008) (ordering disgorgement of trustee’s fees after it was
discovered that trustee made certain misrepresentations regarding the proposed settlement).
69. QPSX Ltd v Ericsson Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 219 ALR 1 (Austl.).
70. See Waye, supra note 1, at 41-45 (describing the relationship between litigation
funding firms and claim holders).
71. See Shukaitis, supra note 20, at 340–41 (discussing how to incentivize the original
claim holder to participate in litigation); George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation
Funding Industry: How Much Justice Can you Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L REV. 805, 819-20
(2001) (noting that successful recovery in a suit may depend on the cooperation of the tort
victim).
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firms tend to hold between thirty and sixty percent of the claim.72
At present, litigation funding firms tend not to be “interested in
funding personal injury claims involving physical or mental injury to
individuals that rely heavily on oral testimony and witness credibility
because of the greater risks associated with these claims.” 73 Instead, they
“prefer commercial claims where the primary evidence is documentary.”.74
Firms also tend to set minimum values for claims; for example, one firm
does not fund cases below seven hundred fifty thousand Australian dollars
in value, while another firm wants a stake of at least one to two million
Australian dollars.75
Firms fund cases where the risk is small and where they estimate the
probability of winning a successful judgment or settlement to be large. At
one firm, the probability of succeeding by judgment or settlement must be
greater than ninety-five percent, while at another, the required probability
of success is fifty percent.76 Firms prefer cases that are likely to settle
quickly, because the longer and more complex a matter is, the greater the
firm’s risk.77 Litigation funding firms also thoroughly investigate the claim
holder, especially if the claim holder is to be a key witness in the case. 78
Claim owners must provide detailed information to the third-party
funder prior to concluding the funding contract. The funder then uses the
information to conduct a risk analysis. If the funder’s exposure to risk is
small, then the funder may make an offer of funding without further
inquiry. However, if the risks are high, the funder does due diligence on
the claim.79 During this process, the funder will evaluate the claim amount,
verify the liquidity of the defendant(s), obtain fee estimates for legal and
other expert advice, and seek counsel’s opinion regarding the likely success
of the claim. Throughout this process, the funder retains the right to
terminate the financing arrangement if new evidence emerges which
negatively impacts upon the chances of a successful outcome.80
Once funders become involved, their role within the litigation
environment can vary. Some firms essentially act as a banker. Although
they monitor the prosecution of the claim by the claim holder’s lawyers and
ensure compliance with budget caps, they do not participate in the day-to72. Interview with John Walker, supra note 42; see also Legg, supra note 54
(providing examples of funding agreement provisions in which the funding firm receives
only a portion of a judgment or settlement recovery).
73. WAYE, supra note 1, at 282-83.
74. Interview with John Walker, supra note 42.
75. WAYE, supra note 1, at 282-83.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 41.
80. Id. at 41.
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day management of the claim nor do they provide instructions to the claim
holder’s lawyers.81 While funders do engage in informal communication
with the claim holders, they need not formally report to the client.82
Although firms differ on this policy, some firms do not exercise veto rights
over whether a claim holder accepts or declines a settlement offer.83
One firm requires the lawyers to report regularly, but it is not active in
the control of strategy or in the management of litigation. The firm’s main
concern is that the claim is progressing within an agreed-upon budget.84 It
sets a global budget for legal services and the lawyers then determine how
to “prosecute the claim within that budget;” however, it does not control
the budget on a line-item basis.85
Other firms are even more active and monitor and advise throughout
the process.86 The funder may cap lawyers’ fees and establish clear
timelines to align budget and strategy.87 Any settlement proposal must be a
joint decision between the funding firm and the claim holder. In no case do
the firms “have a fiduciary duty to the client,” and instead see their
“position as analogous to insurers,” and only owe a “duty of good faith to
the client.”88
III. THEORY
Economic theory is ambiguous as to the effects of litigation funding.
While there have been several excellent theoretical discussions on the
topic,89 there has been little formal work and no empirical work conducted
to date. Below, we outline a simple model of litigation trading, but we first
summarize some of the predictions from the theoretical literature.
Shukaitis (1987) suggests that litigation trading could increase the
value of compensation to claimants and increase deterrence for a host of
activities.90 It could also lead to more nuisance suits and a greater volume
81. Id. at 286-87.
82. Id. at 287-88.
83. Id. at 284-85.
84. Id. at 286.
85. Id. .
86. Id. at 286-87.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 284-86.
89. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J.
697 (2005) (considering the normative question of whether legal claims should be
alienable); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383
(1989) [hereinafter Cooter, Towards a Market] (developing a model for unmatured tort
claims in light of economic theory); Mariel Rodak, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking
Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PENN. L.
REV. 503 (2006) (applying systems thinking to litigation finance).
90. Shukaitis, supra note 20, at 334–41.
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and duration of litigation.91 Litigation funding promotes claims brought by
indigent and risk-averse victims that would not otherwise be pursued.92
Abramowicz (2005) maintains that litigation trading will lead to an
increase in cases that are weak on the merits, but that plaintiffs manage to
“puff up” by misrepresenting the particulars to a litigation funding
company. Potential claims sellers will have an incentive to overstate their
claims to potential buyers, thereby creating an adverse selection problem.93
The third-party buyers have worse information about the claim than either
the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, only claims that do not settle are likely
to be offered on the claims market.94
Abramowicz predicts litigation funding will cause an increase in cases
being pursued in jurisdictions where damage awards are more
unpredictable.95 In such areas, risk-averse plaintiffs will prefer a small,
sure recovery to a large, uncertain recovery. As a larger entity with deeper
pockets, the litigation funder is able to act in a risk-neutral way. In one
scenario Abramowicz posits, litigation funding companies will over-litigate
(even at a loss) to create fearful reputations in the short-run, thereby
facilitating easier settlements in the future.96 Litigation funders will prefer
a long-term strategy whereby most cases settle, because this would be the
least costly method of maximizing profits.97
The qualitative literature predicts that under a litigation funding
regime, claimants will recover the claim amount sooner and could
minimize their own risk by selling to a risk-neutral third party. The thirdparty funders consolidate and accelerate cases because they can pool
similar claims and act as repeat players.
Thus far, the literature discussed has considered ex post trading in
litigation claims; that is, claims for which the harm has already occurred.
In a pair of fascinating papers, Robert Cooter considers a closely related
topic: a market in unmatured claims.98 Cooter proposes a market in which
individuals could make ex ante sales of litigation claims, even before any
harm occurs. For example, individuals with health insurance may want to
sell the right to sue for a workplace injury, knowing that health expenses
91. Id. at 342–46.
92. See id. at 338 (“Given their expected risk averseness, poorer tort victims may be
especially dissuaded from pursuing valid claims because of the costs involved.”).
93. Abramowicz, supra note 89, at 743–45.
94. Id. at 744–45; Shukaitis, supra note 20, at 344.
95. Abramowicz, supra note 89, at 735–37, 740–41.
96. Id. at 728.
97. See id. at 728-29 (analogizing litigation funders to insurance companies, which
often settle cases). .
98. Robert Cooter & Stephen D. Sugarman, A Regulated Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims: Tort Reform by Contract, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 174 (W. Olsen ed.,
1988); Cooter, Towards a Market, supra note 89.
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would almost certainly be covered by insurance.99 While related to a
market for third-party litigation funding ex post, Cooter’s idea has yet to be
implemented.
In Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem,
Molot considers the shortcomings of the predominance of settlement in the
current disposal of most litigation.100 Parties to a settlement may have very
different time or risk preferences, but settlements may differ substantially
from those to which risk-neutral parties would agree. A market for
litigation claims would allow risk-neutral parties to negotiate settlements
(or litigate) with outcomes that better reflect the strength of cases and the
law. Molot considers a related topic in A Market in Litigation Risk,101 a
paper that is closer to Cooter’s (1988) and Cooter and Sugarman’s (1989)
work in considering the effects of trading ex ante litigation claims. In
contrast, the focus of our paper is on trading or funding of ex post claims.
In order to be more precise about the expected effects of litigation
trading on a market for litigation claims, we formally model the litigation
process of a risk-averse claimant. Suppose a plaintiff bringing a suit has
two possible outcomes, a gain of A or 0, with probabilities p and (1-p),
respectively. The cost of bringing the suit is C. A risk-neutral individual
pursues the suit if its expected value is greater than the cost;
mathematically, this suit will be pursued if pA > C. If the individual is
risk-averse, we can describe the individual as one who only pursues cases
with a positive certainty equivalent. To be concrete, assume the following
utility function over gambles:
U = E(r) - 0.005R2, where R denotes the risk aversion parameter and the
utility function is calibrated so that everything is measured in percent.102 In
terms of return, the gamble is between a gain of ( )and a loss of 100%:
(

)
(

(

)

)

99. In a later paper, Cooter labels such a system “anti-insurance.” Robert Cooter &
Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203 (2002).
100. Molot, Litigation Finance, supra note 9.
101. Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009).
102. This type of utility function is sometimes used in finance for illustrative purposes.
While it is clearly unrealistic for some values, it is chosen here because of its analytical
tractability.
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The expected return is straightforward to calculate:
( )

(

(

)

(

)

)(

)

(

)

We can also calculate how much uncertainty there is to the plaintiff, as
measured by the variance of the return. Since there are only two possible
outcomes, this simply requires calculating the variance for an uncertain
event with binary outcomes, as follows:
( )

(
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(
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]
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Which simplifies to:

Now we return to the plaintiff’s utility function and plug in for E(r)
and
( )
and determine when this will have a positive value:
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Now this function can be examined or plotted to help understand the
comparative statics. We can hold all other parameters fixed and take the
derivative of p with respect to R or C. A decrease in R (the risk aversion
parameter) will lead to a decrease in p. This illustrates that risk-neutral
entities (like third-party funders) are willing to litigate cases with a lower
probability of return.
The results for litigation costs, C, are a bit more complicated. For
most reasonable values of C, higher litigation costs will lead to a
requirement of a higher p: individuals litigate cases with a higher
probability of success. This illustrates the theory that if litigation funding
allows the smoothing of risk and the relaxing of credit constraints (and
hence lowering of costs), individuals will litigate cases with a lower
probability of a successful outcome and the number of suits may rise.
One limitation of this model, however, is that the probability p of
winning a lawsuit is exogenous to litigation funding. But litigation funding
could increase the probability of winning a lawsuit. For example, litigation
funding may help in the discovery process. Larger, more complex lawsuits
could arise and lawsuit quality could be endogenous to litigation funding.103
IV. DATA
The empirics we present draw upon data from three main sources.
First, we have personally been in contact with the largest litigation funding
firm, IMF (Australia) Ltd, which has captured over half of the market share
in Australia.104 IMF has provided a list of lawsuits that it has funded as
well as a list of lawsuits considered but not funded. The data from the
lawsuits funded includes opening and closing dates, monthly profit and

103. On the other hand, litigation funding could decrease the amount of damages
awarded if the court knows that the damages awarded are going to a third party.
104. Letter from John Walker, Exec. Director, IMF (Australia) Ltd, to Laurie Glanfield,
Secretary, Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, (Aug. 11, 2006) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law).
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loss, expenditures, return on investment, case classification, and case
location.105
Figure 1. Distribution of Case Duration of Cases Funded by IMF (Days)

Between August 2001 and June 2010, IMF funded 113 cases, the
average length of which was 850 days, or 2.33 years.106 Figure 1 presents
the case duration distribution, which is right-skewed. A handful of cases
continued without resolution for many years, but the bulk of the cases are
resolved within the first two years.
During this time period, IMF received an internal rate of return of
seventy-five percent before overhead expenses.107 Profits for most cases
ranged between a loss and gain of less than a million Australian dollars
(AUD). As would be expected, losses are limited, and there are some
notable cases with profits of several million AUD.108

105. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, IMF Lawsuit Financial Data (Sept. 8, 2010)
(unpublished spreadsheets) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Abrams & Chen, IMF
Data]. These documents are confidential and cannot be distributed publicly.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Profits Per Case

Thirteen of the 113 cases actually went to court and were resolved by
judicial opinion. From February 1999 to June 2007, IMF chose to fund 91
of the 763 cases considered.109 The data available on cases considered
includes the date opened, cause of action, management commentary, IMF
investment manager, IMF state manager, estimated return, and the
estimated completion date.110 From IMF’s shareholder publications, we
also obtained the jurisdictions of the cases that were funded from 2001 to
2003,111 the case categories for all cases funded from 2004 to 2007,112 and
the total litigation contracts in progress from 2002 to 2008.113
Cases are classified primarily into three categories: commercial (often
contract disputes), group (class action), and insolvency. The distribution
across case type can be found in Table 1. Insolvency cases are the largest
category, but this is largely attributable to the historic origins of litigation
funding.114 Since bankruptcy was the one domain where purchasing
litigation has historically been allowed, many of the earliest cases fall into
this category. More recent cases represent a more diverse set of legal
fields.
109. Abrams & Chen, IMF Data, supra note 105.
110. Id.
111. Alden Halse & Hugh McLernon, IMF (Australia) Ltd, IMF (Australia) Ltd August
2003 Presentation (Aug. 2003) (on file at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
Business Law).
112. IMF (AUSTRALIA) LTD, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (June 30, 2008), available at
http://www.imf.com.au/annualreports.asp.
113. Id. at 53.
114. JOHN WALKER, IMF (AUSTRALIA) LTD, SUBMISSIONS ON STATE REGULATION OF
LITIGATION FUNDING 4 (2005); WAYE, supra note 1, at 5.
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Table 1
Distribution of Funded Case Types
Frequency

Percent

Commercial

21

23

Group

28

31

Insolvency

42

46

Total

91

100

Our second data source is the Australian Report of the Government
(ROGS).115 From this source we obtained data on the supreme and federal
courts for each Australian state116 separated by civil and criminal matters
for the years 1994 to 2009.117 The advantage of having criminal as well as
civil data is that the criminal cases should not be affected at all by litigation
funding. Thus, this data acts as a control group. The data includes
lodgments, finalizations, several measures of expenditures and income,
case backlog, case duration, clearance rate, court fees, and attendances
(appearances) per finalization.118 We also make use of population data for
each state obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, from which we
create per capita lodgments and finalizations.119

115. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT SERVICES,
http://www.pc.gov.au/gsp/reports/rogs (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). Not all variables were
available for all years.
116. See Figure 3, infra, for a map of Australia.
117. Report on Government Services, supra note 114.
118. For a definition of these variables, please see the Appendix.
119. AUSTRALIA BUREAU OF STATISTICS, AUSTRALIAN DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS,
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/second+level+view?ReadForm&prodno=310
1.0&viewtitle=Australian%20Demographic%20Statistics~Jun%202010~Latest~21/12/2010
&&tabname=Past%20Future%20Issues&prodno=3101.0&issue=Jun%202010&num=&vie
w=& (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
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Figure 3. Map of Australian Jurisdictions120

The third data source is LexisNexis Australia, from which we obtained
data on all published opinions for cases considered by IMF between
February 1999 and June 2007. Within the Lexis database, we searched for
each of the 763 cases considered, locating a total of sixteen unfunded cases
and seven funded cases.121 For each of these cases we collected data
regarding the date, attorneys, court, litigants, judge, citations to other cases,
subsequent positive and negative citations, and more detailed information
about the case.122 This data was used to examine the effect of litigation
funding on the establishment of precedent.
V. ANALYSIS
The ideal experiment to test the theories described above would
consist of a law change randomly chosen to take place in certain
(treatment) jurisdictions and not in other (control) jurisdictions. One could
then compare outcomes of interest such as settlement rates, settlement
amounts, time to settlement, court caseload, court expenditures, and the
development of precedent, between the treated and control jurisdictions.
Because of the recent changes in the attitudes toward litigation funding in
Australia, we have a situation that comes close to the ideal experiment.
However, reality differs from the ideal in several important ways.
120. Australia
States
Rs01
Australia
Maps,
MAPSOF.NET,
http://mapsof.net/map/australia-states-rs01#.UWRWCBlXxcJ (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).
121. The LexisNexis searches were based on the description that IMF recorded for each
case considered.
122. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, LexisNexis Australia Compilation of Opinions
from IMF Considered & Funded Cases (2010) (unpublished document) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Abrams & Chen, LexisNexis Australia Data].
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First, while some Australian states have officially discarded maintenance
and champerty doctrines, others have not; those that have not still allow
litigation funding.123 Second, the timing of the introduction of litigation
funding in a state is not always coincident with the law change. Third, data
on many of the most interesting outcome variables (particularly on
settlements) is impossible to obtain.
With these limitations in mind, we proceed with an analysis that is as
close to the ideal experiment as possible. As a proxy for the change in
maintenance and champerty laws across jurisdictions, we use the amount of
money IMF spent in a particular jurisdiction at a particular time. This
becomes the key variable of interest in our regressions and serves as a
measure of how open a particular state is to litigation funding. What we
would like to do is determine the impact of the funding on various
outcomes, while accounting for the fact that states have other differences
besides funding levels and that funding can also vary over time for other
reasons. In regression form:
EQUATION 1.
Outcomejt = ß*(Fundingjt) + t + j + jt
where t indexes year and j indexes jurisdiction. Outcomejt is one of the
variables from the ROGS reports: lodgments, finalizations, several
measures of expenditures and income, case backlog, case duration,
clearance rate, court fees, and attendances (appearances) per finalization. t
and j and are fixed effects for jurisdiction124 and year, which allow for
overall differences unrelated to funding levels in outcomes by state and
year, respectively.125
In order to have a causal interpretation in the above regression, the
variation of litigation funding across jurisdictions must be assumed to be
exogenous. It is possible that there are jurisdiction-year characteristics that
attract funding and are also related to the outcomes of interest. To address
this challenge to a causal interpretation, we make use of what is effectively
a placebo: criminal cases. Because litigation funding is only allowed in

123. WAYE, supra note 1, at 55-78. Mere funding is not maintenance and mere funding
for reward is not champerty. Impropriety needs to be proved. Litigation funding firms can
fund in the States and Territories that have not abolished maintenance and champerty, and if
challenged, these firms merely need to prove that their funding is not improper maintenance.
See supra Part 0 (citing examples where courts have found that litigation funding was not
improper maintenance).
124. Because we use state fixed effects, a jurisdiction that has no IMF expenditures
during our timeframe will drop out in our analysis.
125. We use robust standard errors and do not cluster our standard errors at the state
level since our dataset would only have seven clusters -- too few by conventional standards.
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civil cases, one would not expect any impact on criminal cases. These
cases may thus be employed as a control for any unobservable overall
changes in a jurisdiction at a particular time. We should then be able to
draw a causal inference about the impact of more litigation funding on civil
outcomes in a particular jurisdiction at a particular time. Thus, the
dependent variable is the difference between the particular outcome
measure for civil cases and for criminal cases.
EQUATION 2.
(Outcomeciviljt - Outcomecrimjt) = ß*(Fundingjt) + t + j + jt
Before proceeding to the main results, we first present in Figures 4-7
the variation in IMF funding over time in four Australian states. Although
decreasing somewhat in 2008, New South Wales has seen relatively
consistent funding levels of several million AUD per year between 2002
and 2007. The spending in Queensland is more volatile: spending was
approximately one million AUD in 2002; it dropped off sharply through
2005, and since 2006 has recovered to some extent. Victoria has seen
higher levels of funding than Queensland; however, its funding peaked in
2005 and has declined somewhat since then. Finally, Western Australia
has seen a fairly steady growth in funding and was the only state examined
to have an increase in funding in 2008. One of the important points to note
from a comparison of the temporal funding patterns is that there is a
substantial amount of variation across the states. This adds confidence to
the assumption that funding is not driven simply by overall national time
trends.
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Figure 4. IMF Annual Expenditures in New South Wales126

Figure 5. IMF Annual Expenditures in Queensland127

126. Abrams & Chen, IMF Data, supra note 105.
127. Abrams & Chen, IMF Data, supra note 105.
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Figure 6. IMF Annual Expenditures in Victoria128

Figure 7. IMF Annual Expenditures in Western Australia129

The main results of the regression analysis are presented in Panel A of
Table 2, infra page 133. The table presents results from nine separate
regressions, each using the specification described in Equation 2, supra
page 127, with the dependent variable noted at the top of each column.
The coefficient of interest is that on IMF expenditures and robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses.

128. Abrams & Chen, IMF Data, supra note 105.
129. Abrams & Chen, IMF Data, supra note 105.
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Several interesting findings are apparent in the table.
First,
finalizations decrease with increased funding (column 2), although
lodgments do not change a statistically significant amount (column 1). The
combination of these observations suggests that cases tend to take longer to
conclude when a litigation funder enters the legal market. There are
several other pieces of evidence that point in the same direction. The
backlog of non-appealed civil cases increases substantially relative to the
non-appealed criminal backlog as IMF spending increases (column 6). As
one might expect, it appears that finalizations decrease and the backlog
increases. The clearance rate also declines to a statistically significant
degree as third party funding increases (column 7). Finally, even when
normalizing finalizations by population size, one sees a significant (at the
ten percent level) decline with increased funding (column 8).
Table 2: Impact of Third-Party Funding on Court Processing
Lodgments Finalizations Recurrent
Net
Backlog,
Backlog,
Clearance Finalizations /Attendances /
Expenditures Expenditures
Appeals
Nonappeals
Rate
Population Finalization
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Panel A
IMF Expenditurest
N
R2
Panel B
IMF Expenditurest-1
N
R2
Panel C
IMF Expenditurest+1
N
2

-0.240
(0.204)
35
0.960

-0.434
(0.210)*
35
0.956

846.2
(522.2)
35
0.984

1118.2
(391.2)***
35
0.943

-0.00514
(0.00562)
30
0.283

0.00704
-0.0135
-0.00824
(0.00200)*** (0.00408)*** (0.00466)*
30
30
35
0.684
0.611
0.828

0.000223
(0.000232)
23
0.680

-0.182
(0.198)
30
0.981

-0.0853
(0.353)
30
0.949

-1502.7
(1044.5)
30
0.986

-1377.1
(790.3)*
30
0.958

0.00249
(0.00385)
30
0.239

0.00252
(0.00261)
30
0.589

0.00278
(0.00580)
30
0.475

-0.00213
(0.00724)
30
0.801

-0.000193
(0.000235)
23
0.678

-0.349
(0.234)
30

-0.270
(0.197)
30

-268.3
(745.1)
30

-693.8
(817.9)
30

0.00129
(0.00495)
25

0.000832
(0.00527)
25

-0.00940
(0.00563)
25

-0.00266
(0.00457)
30

0.000581
(0.000275)*
19

R
0.960
0.956
0.981
0.935
0.284
0.591
0.578
0.833
0.686
Regressions run using state-year observations obtained from the Australia ROGS reports for the years 2002-2008. States included are New South
Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, and Western Australia. These are the states where IMF was actively investing. All regressions include
state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Together, these regression results tell a consistent story: an increase in
activity of litigation funders leads to more sclerotic courthouses. One
might expect this increased litigation to be reflected in greater spending by
the courts, and indeed columns 3 and 4 bear this out. While the coefficient
on recurrent expenditures (column 3) is insignificant, the measure of
expenditures that is more responsive to caseload fluctuations is net
expenditures, which does have a statistically significant relationship with
IMF expenditures. Overall, we see a pattern of increased funding
corresponding to slower case processing, larger backlogs, and increased
spending by the courts.
In the next section we discuss the robustness and significance of these
findings and explore some possible channels for these results. For
example, Panel B shows that IMF expenditures are not correlated with
court processing outcomes in the year following the IMF expenditures.
First, we present the findings from the other main analysis undertaken,
a comparison between funded and unfunded published cases (Table 3).
From the universe of cases that IMF considered funding, we collect all with
published opinions found in LexisNexis Australia. We compare the
number of citations from and to other cases for the seven funded and
sixteen unfunded published cases. There is a substantial difference in both
measures of case significance. Funded cases cite almost forty other cases
on average, while cases IMF chose not to fund cite fewer than twenty.
Even more indicative of case significance is the number of times
funded cases have been cited. Here we find eleven citations on average for
funded cases in comparison to fewer than five citations for the unfunded
cases. The magnitude of the differences is extremely large. To the extent
that citations are a good proxy for precedential importance, it appears that
when litigation funders enter a market, they create more precedent earlier
on. One potential concern may be that the funded cases are older, on
average, than unfunded cases and have therefore had more time to gather
cites. The funded cases are slightly older, less than 6 months on average,
which is not enough to explain a disparity of this magnitude. We explore
the robustness of the findings presented thus far in the next section.
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Table 3. Citation Rates by Funded Status130

Citations to
Other Cases
Citations to the
Case
Observations

Funded

Not Funded

Ratio

38.7

19.0

2.0

(32.1)

(22.7)

11.0

4.6

(8.9)

(7.8)

16

7

2.4

VI. ROBUSTNESS AND INTERPRETATION
Since our identification strategy relies on changes in IMF expenditures
across states and across time, the biggest concern to a causal interpretation
is that IMF expenditures may themselves be driven by other factors that
correlate with court processing. Moreover, the results presented so far do
not rule out the possibility of reverse causality. Demand for third-party
litigation funding may be greatest when the courts are the most backlogged.
We address this concern in several ways. First, we look one year before
the IMF expenditures to see if court processing is driving demand for third
party litigation funding. Second, we use financial data on cases that IMF
considered, both funded and non-funded, as a proxy for demand for thirdparty litigation funding.
One possible explanation for the results discussed thus far is that more
congested courts attract more third-party funding. We test this by running
the same regressions as presented in panel A of Table 2, but using IMF
expenditure data from the year after the court processing data. We find
(Panel C of Table 2) that no court processing measure is related to IMF
expenditures in the year before the IMF expenditures occurred, except for
attendances per finalization. This provides some support for IMF
expenditures being unrelated to court processing.
Even though we use criminal cases as a control group to address
possible omitted variables, there are some omitted variables that may be

130

The figures in parentheses represent standard deviations. Abrams & Chen, LexisNexis
Australia Data, supra note 122.
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specific to civil cases and litigation funding that could be correlated with
court processing. For example, if IMF funding is representative of overall
litigation funding and the other fifty percent of unmeasured litigation
funding happens precisely where IMF funding occurs, then our estimates
would be overestimated by a factor of two. On the other hand, if IMF is
active precisely where the other fifty percent of litigation funders are not
active, then our estimates would be understated, although in the extreme
case, we would not be able to estimate any effects at all. This is likely not
the case given the fact that some states still have champerty and
maintenance facing criminal penalties on the books, even though it is not
strictly enforced.
Alternative litigation funding is not the only source of omitted
variable bias, however. Arbitration and contingency fee arrangements are
also unmeasured. The same logic applies as in the case of alternative
litigation funding. Here, it may very well be the case that these alternative
funding arrangements compete, in which case our estimates are
overestimates. Alternatively, if arbitration and contingency fees are used
by the clients who were rejected by IMF or other litigation funders, then
our tests using the measure for demand for litigation funding would
alleviate this omitted variable concern.
Finally, we return to the issue of the development of law and
establishment of precedent. Different courts may have different citation
patterns and later cases may receive fewer citations than earlier ones. In
Table 4, we improve upon the citation statistics reported in Table 3 by
allowing for those possibilities. We find that funded cases still receive
more total citations and that this is statistically significant at the ten percent
level. If we included cases that did not go to court (or otherwise were not
able to be found in Lexis Australia) as receiving no citations, then the
estimated effects of funding are vastly more significant, as about eight
percent of funded cases had an opinion but roughly two percent of nonfunded cases had an opinion.
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Table 4: Impact of Funding on Development of Law -- Robustness Check
Log Total Cites
Log Positive
Log Cases This
Cites
Cited
(1)
(2)
(3)
Funded
0.869
0.346
0.578
(0.445)*
(0.284)
(0.493)
N
23
23
23
R2
0.243
0.202
0.139
Regressions run using case-level observations obtained from the Australia
Lexis-Nexis reports for cases that IMF considered and had a published
opinion. All logs are of 1 plus the original value to avoid dropping zeros.
These regressions include court fixed effects and a linear time trend.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

We additionally make use of data on the reversal rate of these cases.
The funded cases are reversed twenty-five percent of the time. At first
glance this suggests that litigation funding still has taint, as the courts do
not appear to consider the law to have as precedential value for funded
cases. In the respective jurisdictions and years, only five percent of cases
are reversed. However, non-funded but considered cases are reversed
thirty-one percent of the time. This suggests that the high reversal rate may
actually be due to selection, and conditional on seeking IMF funding,
funding actually decreases reversal rate.131
CONCLUSION
Ambitious statements have been made about the potential impact of
allowing a market in litigation claims. Predictions include effects on
settlement rates, settlement amounts, time before a settlement, litigation
quantity, and development of precedent. In this paper we have sought to
conduct the first empirical test of some of these claims using several
newly-obtained datasets from Australia.
We find that litigation funders appear to have an impact on the
functioning of courts. States that have a greater litigation funding presence
experience a greater backlog in courts, fewer finalizations, and a lower
clearance rate. This is also reflected in court expenditures, which increase
with greater litigation funding.
While congesting the courts may be a cost of third-party funding, the
overall welfare effects could still be positive. If the value of the
131. This analysis does not address the conventional view of taint, where a jury finds
out that the damages being awarded to a party are actually going to a litigation funder.
None of the cases where we found opinions in Lexis Australia had juries.
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adjudication of cases is greater than the expense of adjudicating them, then
third party funding should be encouraged. Further, court congestion may
be a transitory effect of the entry of litigation funders, and not one that
persists. The expectation would be that once defendants recognize the
increased likelihood of litigation and the greater resources held by
plaintiffs, they would be more likely to settle in equilibrium. While
transitioning to that new equilibrium, there is another potential benefit from
litigation funding: earlier resolution of the law.
Litigation funding does appear to have precedential value. By two
different measures, cases funded by IMF have greater importance than
those they did not fund, but which proceeded to trial in any case. Funded
cases both cite and receive over twice as many references as unfunded
cases. If citations are a good proxy for legal precedent, then third-party
funding appears to promote its more rapid development. While a full
welfare analysis is well beyond the scope of this paper, the closest realworld attempt at a market in litigation claims has had a meaningful impact
on the judicial system in Australia.
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APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS
BACKLOG INDICATOR – A measure of case processing timeliness. It is
the number of pending cases older than the applicable reporting standards,
divided by the total pending caseload (multiplied by one hundred to convert
to a percentage).
LODGMENTS – The initiation or commencement of a matter before the
court. The date of commencement is counted as the date of registration of
a court matter.
FINALIZATION – The completion of a matter so it ceases to be an item
of work to be dealt with by the court. Finalizations are derived from
timeliness data that may not reflect the total matters disposed by the courts
in the reporting period.
CLEARANCE RATE – A measure of whether a court is keeping up with
its workload. It is the number of finalizations in the reporting period,
divided by the number of lodgments in the same period (multiplied by one
hundred to convert to a percentage).
ATTENDANCE INDICATOR – The average number of attendances for
each finalization in the reporting period. An attendance is defined as the
number of times that parties or their representatives are required to be
present in court (including any appointment which is adjourned or
rescheduled) for all finalized matters during the year. The actual
attendance is one that is heard by a judicial officer or mediator/arbitrator.
NET EXPENDITURE – Net expenditure refers to expenditure minus
income (where income is derived from court fees and other revenue but
excludes fines).
RECURRENT EXPENDITURE – Recurrent expenditure provides an
estimate of annual service costs. Recurrent expenditure on courts
administration includes judiciary and in-court expenditure, court and
probate registries, sheriff and bailiff’s offices, court accommodation and
other overheads. The components of the expenditure include salary and
non-salary expenditure, court administration agency and umbrella
department expenditure, and contract expenditure.
Total recurrent
expenditure by Australian, State and Territory court authorities (excluding
the High Court and specialist courts) was $1.2 billion in 2004-05.
POPULATION – A lodgment that is yet to be finalized but is part of the
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